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THE PERIOD DURING WHICH A JUDGMENT
REMAINS A LIEN ON REALTY IN FLORIDA
JAms W. DAY
I. INTRODUCTION

It has been stated frequently in the decisions that a judgment obtained in Florida remains a lien for twenty years.' These statements,
however, are general in character, and the factual settings with reference
to which they are made do not involve the question as to whether such a
lien can ever extend beyond that period. No statute deals expressly with
the duration of the lien of a Florida judgment; and the fact that the
lien normally terminates in twenty years is attributable to the provision
of Section 95.11 of Florida Statutes (Cum. Supp. 1947) that an action
can be brought upon a judgment or decree of a Florida court of record
only within twenty years. 2 The problem is presented, therefore, as to
whether the time that a judgment remains a lien is extended by any
event that increases the period in which an action may be brought on the
judgment. The importance of this problem to the title examiner rests
on the fact that when a judgment debtor conveys land even for value
while the judgment lien continues, his grantee takes the land subject
to the lien, 3 as also do subsequent grantees holding under the first
grantee.
II.

STATUTORY BACKGROUND

When, as in Florida, no period is specifically provided by statute for
the continuance of the lien of a judgment, the lien continues while a right
1

See Spurway v. Dyer, 48 F. Supp. 255, 258 (S. D. Fla. 1942); Blackburn v.
Venice Inlet Co., 38 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla. 1948) ; Orr v. Allen-Hanford, Inc., 158 Fla. 34,
37, 27 So.2d 823, 825 (1946) ; B. A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 304, 306, 14 So.2d
667, 669 (1943); Massey v. Pineapple Orange Co., 87 Fla. 374, 378, 100 So. 170, 171
(1924).
2

assey v. Pineapple Orange Co., 87 Fla. 374, 100 So. 170 (1924).
3Giddens v. McFarlan, 152 Fla. 276, 10 So.2d 807 (1943).
[ 3151
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exists either to obtain an execution on the judgment or to revive the judg4
ment by scire Jacias.
Section 55.15 of Florida Statutes 1941 entitles a judgment creditor
to an execution at any time within three years from the rendition of the
judgment. If no execution is issued during that period, the judgment
creditor can subsequently revive the judgment by scire facias at any time
until the right to bring an action on the judgment is barred by the statute
of limitations. An execution obtained on the revived judgment can be
levied on the land of the judgment debtor until the right to bring an
action on the judgment is barred. 5
If an execution is taken out within three years after the rendition of a
judgment, or apparently if it is taken out later as the result of scire facias,
the judgment creditor is empowered by Section 55.15 to renew it from
time to time for twenty years by returning it to the clerk's office of the
original execution. 6 This twenty-year period begins with the date the
judgment is rendered and not with the time when the execution is issued. 7
Since May 22, 1937, however, when Section 55.16 of Florida Statutes
1941 became effective, it has been unnecessary to renew an execution that
has been issued. 8 This section provides that when a final judgment is
rendered, the judgment creditor may obtain an execution by requesting
it, and that the execution thus issued remains "valid and effective during the life or effective period of the judgment." It does not, however,
repeal Section 55.15 or obviate the necessity of reviving by scire facids a
judgment before an execution can issue in an instance in which no execution has been taken out within three years of the rendition of the judgment. 9
Prior to the enactment of Section 55.16, Section 55.15 thus fixed at
twenty years, without reference to the twenty-year limitation period applicable under Section 95.11 to the bringing of an action on a judgment,
the time during which an execution once issued could be renewed. This
period, therefore, seemingly would not have been extended by a circum'Lamon v. Gold, 72 W. Va. 618, 79 S. E. 728 (1913); accord, Massey v. Pineapple
Orange Co., 87 Fla. 374, 100 So. 170 (1924).
'Massey v. Pineapple Orange Co., supra note 4; accord, Spurway v. Dyer, 48 F.
Supp. 255 (S. D. Fla. 1942); B. A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 304, 14 So.2d 667
(1943).
'Tedder v. Morrow, 100 Fla. 1486, 131 So. 387 (1930).
vAccord, Massey v. Pineapple Orange Co., 87 Fla. 374, 100 So. 170 (1924).
'See B. A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 304, 306, 14 So.2d 667, 669 (1943).
'Spurway v. Dyer, 48 F. Supp. 255 (S. D. Fla. 1942).
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stance that tolled the running of the statute of limitations. Even before
the effective date of Section 55.16, however, it would appear that after
the expiration of the twenty years a new execution would have remained
a lien during that time. Similarly, if no execution had ever been issued,
one could have been obtained by scire Jacias during any extension of the
limitation period, and during that extension the lien of the judgment
would have continued.
Since the effective date of Section 55.16, it likewise seems that during
any such extension an issued execution remains effective, and that when
no execution has been issued previously, one can be obtained by scire
facias. The lien of the judgment consequently continues during the
extension.
In Florida one who purchases land from a judgment debtor at a time
when the judgment-is dormant, takes it subject to the lien of the judgment; and if the judgment is revived thereafter by scire facias, the land
can be subjected to the satisfaction of the judgment at any time within
the period limited for bringing an action on the judgment.10
It is believed that the continuance of the lien of a judgment through
any extension of the period of limitations is not prevented by Sections
95.28 to 95.34 of Florida Statutes (Cum. Supp. 1947), all of which became effective on May 4, 1945. They provide that when the final maturity of a mortgage or other instrument encumbering real estate is
ascertainable from the record of the instrument, the lien of the instrument terminates twenty years from that maturity date and that no proceeding can be begun thereafter to enforce it unless an extension agreement has been recorded. Similarly, when the final maturity of the obligation is not ascertainable from the record, a limitation period of twenty
years from the date of the instrument is established. These statutes provide that the periods of limitation in question shall not be extended by
non-residence, disability, or part payment, or in any manner other than
by the recording of an extension agreement. They specify that their
provisions are applicable to all instruments encumbering land that were in
existence on May 4, 1945, the enforcement of which was not barred
under law existing on that date, and on which actions were not commenced by May 4, 1946. They exempt from all of their provisions liens
or notices of liens under Chapters 84 (mechanics' liens) and 85 (statutory
liens) of Florida Statutes 1941, and certain instruments executed by public-service corporations.
10

B. A. Lott, Inc. v. Padgett, 153 Fla. 304, 14 So.2d 667 (1943); see Massey v.
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These statutes seek to prevent the liens of "mortgages and other
instruments encumbering real estate" from continuing for indefinite periods. The quoted phrase would seem to exclude from their operation not
only the lien of a judgment entered in a circuit court prior to June 5,
1939, which under Section 55.08 of Florida Statutes 1941 immediately
attached to the land of the defendant in the county where the judgment
was rendered, but also the lien of such a judgment that arose in other
counties with the recording there of a certified transcript of the judgment.
It apparently would likewise exclude the lien of a judgment entered before
June 5, 1939, in a county court, county judge's court, or a court of the
justice of the peace, which under Section 55.09 of Florida Statutes 1941 attached to the land of a defendant in any county when
a transcript of the judgment was filed in that county; and similarly it
would seem to exclude the lien of a judgment rendered in any court on or
since June 5, 1939, which under section 55.10 of Florida Statutes 1941 arises in any county only when a certified transcript is
recorded there in the judgment lien record. These judgments and the
filed and recorded transcripts of them appear not to be "mortgages or other
instruments encumbering real estate" as that expression is used in the
statutes under consideration.
A casual consideration of the provision in those sections exempting from
their operation the liens and notices of liens under Chapters 84 (mechanics'
liens) and 85 (statutory liens), most of which are no more "instruments
encumbering real estate" in the ordinary sense of that term than are judgments, may suggest that the Legislature by the phrase in question intended
to exclude judgment liens. It is more probable, however, that the Legislature by expressly excepting the liens under the two chapters meant merely to prevent the arising of a question as to whether the short duration of
those liens (which in most instances is not in excess of one year) had been
extended by Sections 95.28 to 95.34 to the twenty-year period that they
establish.
Even in the unlikely event that judgments or the filed or recorded
transcripts of them should be held to be "instruments encumbering land,"
apparently the lien of some judgments would nevertheless continue for
more than twenty years. Sections 95.28 to 95.34 provide that there can
be no extension of the twenty-year period from the maturity of the obligation or the date of the instrument in which an action can be brought,
except by the recording of an extension agreement. They make this proPineapple Orange Co., 87 Fla. 374, 380, 100 So. 170, 172 (1924).
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vision applicable even to those instruments within their scope that were in
existence on their effective date, May 4, 1945, and on which no action
was brought within one year thereafter. This phase of their operation is,
however, clearly invalid as to any such instrument for which the period
for bringing the action had, prior to May 4, 1945, been effectively extended beyond twenty years. To apply the statutes to a situation of this
type would violate Section 33 of Article III of the Constitution of Florida,
which provides that no statute shall be passed lessening the time within
which a civil action may be commenced on any cause of action existing
at the time of its passage."3
Since the duration of the lien of at least some judgments and probably
that of the lien of all judgments is thus extended by anything that increases the time in which an action can be brought on the judgment, the
determination of what events and circumstances increase that time becomes important.
III. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT EXTEND THE DURATIoN OV A JUDGMENT LIEN
Absence of Judgment Debtor from the State. The period in which an
action can be brought on a judgment, and consequently the duration of
the lien of the judgment, is in Florida extended by an interval equal to
any time that the judgment debtor is absent from the state in the period
between the entry of the judgment and the time in which the right to bring
an action on the judgment is barred by the statute of limitations. Section
95.07 of Florida Statutes 1941 reads as follows:
"If, when the cause of action shall accrue against a person, he is out
of the state, the action may be commenced within the term herein
limited after his return to the state; and if after the cause of action
shall have accrued he depart from the state, the time of his absence
shall not be part of the time limited for the commencement of the
action."

This section and Section 95.11, which establishes not only the twentyyear period in which an action can be brought on a judgment but also the
"Cf. Baugher v. Boley, 63 Fla. 75, 58 So. 980 (1912). But cf. Campbell v. Home,
147 Fla. 523, 525, 3 So.2d 125, 126 (1941) (Dictum that this constitutional provision
is not violated by the application of a newly enacted statute of limitations to an
existing cause of action that theretofore had not been subject to any limitation period).
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various periods in which other types of actions are barred, are in pari
materia, and each of those periods is subject to extension by the absence
2
of the defendant from the state.'
Whether a general provision for the tolling of the statutes of limitation by the absence of the defendant is applicable to the time in which an
action can be brought on a judgment, is a matter of statutory construction.
When the duration of the lien of a judgement is specifically fixed by
statute without reference to the limitation period for bringing an action on
the judgment, a general provision of this type does not extend the time
that the judgment remains a lien.' 3 When, however, the duration of a
judgment lien is fixed by the statute of limitations as is the case in Florida,
the absence of the judgment debtor will extend the time that the judgment
remains a lien on his real property. 14 This extension of the duration of
the judgment lien is not prevented by the fact that the land of the judgment debtor in the jurisdiction could have been subjected to the satisfaction of the judgment during his absence.' 5
The decisions in Orr v. Allen-Hanford, Inc.'0 and Blackburn v. Venice
Inlet Co.17 are not inconsistent with these conclusions. In each the statement was made that while a creditor may satisfy his judgment within
twenty years, undue delay by him without sufficient reason may in a
shorter period give rise to equitable defenses that will terminate his right.
The facts involved in these cases illustrate the type of situation to which
the statement is applicable. In the former case a mortgagee in foreclosing his mortgage had not joined as defendants certain judgment creditors
of the mortgagor who had obtained their judgments subsequent to the
execution of the mortgage. These judgment creditors made no attempt
to subject the land to their judgments until seventeen years after the foreclosure sale. Throughout this period a grantee from the purchaser at the
"1Van Deren v. Lory, 87 Fla. 422, 100 So. 794 (1924)

(holding that the seven-

year period that bars the bringing of an action in Florida on a judgment obtained in
another state does not begin to run until the judgment debtor comes to Florida, in
an instance when he was neither a resident of Florida nor within the jurisdiction of
that state at the time the judgment was obtained elsewhere).
"Albee v. Curtis, 77 Iowa 644, 42 N. W. 508 (1889).
"See Note, 21 A. L. R. 1038, 1039 (1922); accord, Spiller v. Hollinger, 148 S. W.
338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911).
"SBrittain v. Lankford, 110 Ky. 484, 61 S. W. 1000 (1901); Lamon v. Gold, 72
W. Va. 618, 79 S. E. 728 (1913).
'0158 Fla. 34, 27 So.2d 823 (1946).
738 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1948).
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sale made large expenditures in improving the land. The judgment creditors were held to be precluded from reaching the land by execution, since
as subsequent judgment creditors who had not been joined in the foreclosure suit, they were in the position of junior encumbrancers who had
not been joined, and consequently could enforce their rights, if they had
any, only in equity. The Court implied further that under the circumstances they would be barred in equity by laches.
In the Blackburn case land had been mortgaged in a transaction that
was subsequently contended to have been fraudulent as to creditors of
the mortgagor. Later in the same year one of these creditors obtained a
judgment against the mortgagor. This judgment was assigned to the plaintiff. In a suit brought to foreclose the mortgage the next year, the original
judgment creditor was made a party, but the plaintiff, who had not recorded her assignment, was not. The purchaser at the foreclosure sale,
who was not shown to have had knowledge of the alleged fraud in the original transaction, spent large sums in improving the land. Approximately
eleven years after the foreclosure, the plaintiff filed a creditors' bill to
subject the land to the judgment that had been assigned to her. It was
held that she was not entitled to relief.
Military Service of a Judgment Debtor or a Judgment Creditor. The
time for bringing an action on a judgment and therefore the period that a
judgment obtained in Florida remains a lien is extended also under the
various federal soldiers' and sailors' civil relief acts by any period in which
either the judgment debtor or the judgment creditor was in military service
during the time that those acts suspended the statutes of limitations as applied to persons in the armed forces. The act of March 8, 1918,18 provided that the period of military service of an individual between March 8,
1918, and six months after the termination of the war then being waged,
by a treaty of peace as proclaimed by the President, should not be included
in computing any period then or thereafter limited by any law for the
bringing of any action by or against him or by or against his heirs, personal
representatives, or assigns. The acts of October 17, 1940,19 and October
6, 1942,20 similarly exclude from the periods of the statutes of limitations
applicable to actions by or against an individual or by or against his heirs,
personal representatives, or assigns, any time that he spent in military
1840 STAT. 440 (1918).

1954 STAT. 1178 (1940).
3056 STAT. 770 (1942),

50 U. S. C. §S25 (1946).
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service between October 17, 1940, and six months after the termination of
all wars in which the United States was engaged on May 15, 1945, by
treaties of peace proclaimed by the President.
The duration of the lien of many Florida judgments is extended by
the foregoing provisions.
Stay of Execution or Injunction Restraining Enforcement. A stay of
execution entered on the record of a judgment tolls the running of a statute
21
So also does the relimiting the duration of the lien of the judgment.
injunction obtained
an
by
judgment
the
of
enforcement
the
of
straining
22
to his intersucceeded
has
who
by
one
or
debtor
judgment
either by the
23
on the
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limitation
Since
lien.
to
the
is
subject
that
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debtor
judgment
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to
prevent
duration of the lien is established
be
taken
cannot
it
creditor,
judgment
the
ing prejudiced by the delay of
24
advantage of by the former when he himself has occasioned the delay.
The running of the limitation period against a judgment and its accompanying lien is similarly tolled for the time that its enforcement is enjoined, even when the injunction is obtained by one not in privity with the
25
judgment debtor.
Appeal. Section 95.06 of Florida Statutes 1941 provides that if a judgment for the plaintiff in an action started within the permitted period is
reversed on appeal, the plaintiff can commence a new action within one
year after the reversal. A situation for the application of this statute would
be presented by the reversal of a judgment obtained by a judgment creditor
in an action brought by him on an existing judgment shortly before his
right to bring the action was barred. Since the lien of the original judgment
continues in Florida during the time that an action can be brought on that
"Mercantile Trust Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 69 Fed. 193 (W. D. Ark. 1895);
Bank of the United States v. Winston, 2 Fed. Cas. 743, No. 944 (D. Va. 1825); Pennock v. Hart, 8 S. & R. 369 (Pa. 1822); Michell v. Cue, 2 Burr. 660, 97 Eng. Rep.
498 (K. B. 1758); see Anderson v. Tydings, 8 Md. 427, 443 (1855).
2'Lindsey v. Norrill, 36 Ark. 545 (1880); Wakefield v. Brown, 38 Minn. 361, 37
N. W. 788 (1888); see Masony and Hurtell v. The United States Bank, 4 Ala. 735, 752
(1843) ; Anderson v. Tydings, 8 Md. 427, 443 (1855). But cf. Rogers v. Druffel, 46
Cal. 654 (1873) (under specific statute).
2"Work v. Harper, 31 Miss. 107 (1856).
"Michell v. Cue, 2 Burr. 660, 97 Eng. Rep. 498 (K. B. 1758); cf. State v. Stein,
134 Fla. 241, 183 So. 753 (1938).

"Bartlett & Waring v. Gayle & Phillips, 6 Ala. 305 (1844) ; State ex rel. Young v.
Royse, 3 Neb. (Unof.) 262, 91 N. W. 559 (1902).
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judgment, it would not terminate until one year after the reversal of the
new judgment. Even in the absence of such a statute, it is generally held
that the time during the pendency of an appeal from a judgment with
supersedeas is deducted in the computation of the limitation period applicable to the judgment. 2 6 This rule presumably is in effect in Florida as to
situations not within the scope of Section 95.06.
IV. CIRCUMSTANCES THAT Do NOT EXTEND THE DURATION
OF A JUDGMENT LIEN

Disability of the Judgment Creditor. Under the statutes of Florida,
disabilities of the plaintiff toll the running of the period of limitations only
in the case of actions for the recovery of real property aud have no effect
on other causes of action. 2 7 Consequently, no disability of a judgment
creditor extends the period during which he can bring an action on his
judgment or increases the time that the judgment remains a lien.
New Promise or PartPayment. It seems probable that neither a promise to pay a judgment nor a part payment of it would in Florida prolong
the lien of the judgment or extend the period during which an action
could be brought on the judgment itself. No Florida case deals directly
with these matters, and the relevant precedents from other jurisdictions
are in conflict. 2 8 In the Florida decisions that deny the power of one
joint obligor to bind the other by a promise to pay a note or an open account, made either before 29 or after 3 0 the original debt is barred, it has
been held, however, that the new promise relied on constitutes a new
contract supported by the consideration of the old obligation, and that an
"'Barroilhet vr. Hathaway, 31 Cal. 395 (1866); Rosenberg v. Pritzker, 156 Il.
App. 463 (1910); Ware v. Pleasant Grove, 9 Kan. App. 700, 59 Pac. 1089 (1900);
Jarecki Mig. Co. v. Fleming, 179 Okla. 62, 64 P.2d 659 (1937); see Note, 21 A. L. R.
1038, 1054 (1922) ; accord, Gotlieb v. Thatcher, 151 U. S. 271 (1894). Contra: Byrne,
Vance & Co. v. Garrett, 23 La. Ann. 587 (1871) (controlled by statute) ;cf. Chouteau

v. Nuckolls, 20 Mo. 442 (1855).
"Slaughter v. Tyler, 126 Fla. 515, 171 So. 320 (1936) (holding that the minority
of the plaintiff did not stay the running of the statute of limitations against her
action for medical malpractice, and overruling expressly a dictum to the contrary in
Franklin Ins. Co. v. Thorpe, 118 Fla. 832, 836, 160 So. 199, 201 (1935), with reference to an analogous situation).
8
" See Note, 21 A. L. R. 1038, 1059-1066 (1922).

"eTate v. Clements, 16 Fla. 339 (1878).
"Coker v. Phillips, 89 Fla. 283, 103 So. 612 (1925).
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action in which it is sought to take advantage of the new promise must be
based on the new contract to which it gives rise. Apparently, therefore,
a promise to pay a Florida judgment would at most merely create a new
contract on which an action could be brought, and would not affect the
duration of the judgment lien or the limitation period applicable to the
judgment itself.
It is clear that a part payment of a judgment debt can have no more
effect on the duration of the lien of a Florida judgment than would a
promise to pay the judgment. A part payment of any obligation already
barred by the statute, when unaccompanied by a signed written acknowledgment of the debt as required by Section 95.04 of Florida Statutes 1941,
does not revive the liability to pay it. 3 1 Even if a payment on a judgment not yet barred or an acknowledgment of its obligation would give rise
to a new contract on which an action could be brought, it would do so
only because of the promise to pay that it implied, 3 2 and would not affect
the duration of the judgment lien or the running of the statute against
the right to bring an action on the judgment.
Appointment of a Receiver. The lien of a judgment is not extended
beyond its normal duration by the fact that during its continuance a receiver is appointed at the instance of someone other than the judgment
creditor to take charge of the property of the judgment debtor. 33 Even
after such an appointment the judgment creditor can obtain permission
from the court that appointed the receiver, to levy execution on the land
in the possession of the latter. 3 4 It has even been held that without such
permission the judgment creditor can so levy execution and that if the
consent of the court is necessary to entitle the purchaser at the sale to
possession of the land, the court will grant it. 3 5 Since under neither holding does the appointment of the receiver prevent the judgment creditor
from enforcing the lien of his judgment, that appointment does not affect
the period during which the lien continues.
Agreement of Parties.An agreement between a judgment creditor and
his debtor that the lien of the judgment will extend beyond its normal termination is probably invalid in Florida. By statute in some states, validity
31

Woodham v. Hill, 78 Fla. 517, 83 So. 717 (1919).

"Cf. Cosio v. Guerra, 67 Fla. 331, 65 So. 5 (1914).

"Savings & Trust Co. of Cleveland v. Bear Valley Irr. Co., 89 Fed. 32 (C. C. S. D.
Cal. 1898).

"4See id. at 36.

"Southern Bank of Ky. v. Ohio Ins. Co., 22 Ind. 181 (1864).
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is given to such an agreement 3 6 or to the entry & it on the record of the
judgment. 3 7 There is no statute of this type in Florida. In the absence
of such a statute and under statutory provisions expressly fixing the duration of a judgment lien, it is held that an agreement between the parties
to the judgment cannot extend the duration of the judgment lien.3 8 This
rule seems equally as appropriate in a statutory setting such as that of
Florida, in which the period of continuance of the judgment lien is determined indirectly by the period in which an action can be brought on the
judgment.
Judgment in an Action on an Existing Judgment. It is believed that
the obtaining of a judgment in an action on a existing judgment does not
extend the duration of the lien of the latter. In fact, it is even held in
some jurisdictions that in such a situation the original judgment is merged
in the new one, with the result that the lien of the original judgment is
terminated and the judgment creditor is subordinated to other judgment
creditors who have obtained their judgments in the interval between the
entry of his two judgments 3 9 and to purchasers who have during that interval acquired land from the judgment debtor.4 0 In other jurisdictions
it has been held, however, that merger never occurs until a remedy or evidence of a degree higher than the old obligation has been created, and that
since the original judgment is of as high a nature as the judgment obtained
in the action on it, the former does not merge in the latter. 4 '
Under the latter view, the lien of the original judgment is so preserved that the priority of the judgment creditor over junior judgment
creditors and others continues until the time that it would have ceased
even if no action had been brought on the judgment. 4 2 In the opinion of
the writer, either this view or such a modification of the opposing one as
would continue this priority of the judgment creditor should be adopted.
The question is unsettled in Florida, however.
"'See Davis v. Davis, 174 Fed. 786, 790 (C. C. A. 4th 1909) (Pennsylvania statute).
"'Applegate v. Edwards, 45 Ind. 329 (1873).
"Savings &Trust Co. of Cleveland 'v. Bear Valley Irr. Co., 89 Fed. 32 (C. C. S. D.
Cal. 1898); Gardenhire v. King, 97 Tenn. 585, 37 S. W. 548 (1896).
" McDonald v. Culhane, 303 I1. App. 101, 24 N. E.2d 737 (1940); Champlin v.
Baldwin, 1 Paige 753 (N. Y. 1829). Contra: Springs v. Pharr, 131 N. C. 191, 42 S. E.
590 (1902); cf. Hay v. Alexandria & W. R. R., 20 Fed. 15 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1884);
Armour Bros. Banking Co. v. Addington, 1 Ind. T. 304, 37 S. W. 100 (1896).
"'Bertram v. Waterman, 18 Iowa 529 (1865).
"Springs v. Pharr, 131 N. C. 191, 42 S. E. 590 (1902); Preston v. Perton, Cro.
Eliz. 817, 78 Eng. Rep. 1043 (K. B. 1600).
"Accord, Springs v. Pharr, 131 N. C. 191, 142 S. E. 590 (1902).
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The judgment recovered in an action on a judgment creates a lien of
the same force and effect upon the real estate then owned by the judgment
debtor as does any other judgment. 43 This lien continues for the limitation period that begins on the effective date of the new judgment. Irrespective, however, of the position taken as to the effect of that judgment
on the original judgment and on the priority of the judgment creditor under it, the new judgment apparently does not extend the lien of the original
judgment as an independent lien beyond the time when it would have terminated if the new judgment had not been obtained.
Proceedings Supplementary to Execution. Sections 55.52 to 55.59 of
Florida Statutes 1941 authorize a plaintiff whose execution has been
returned unsatisfied to institute proceedings supplementary to execution in the court from which it was issued. They provide for the examination of the judgment debtor and other witnesses as to the assets of the
former and empower the judge to order the application of any of the nonexempt property of the judgment debtor to the satisfaction of the judgment
debt, regardless of whether that property is in his possession or in that
of another.
It has been held that the same writ of error cannot be directed both to
the final judgment against the defendants rendered in the principal action
and to a final judgment or order obtained against only one of those dedefendants jointly with a third person in a proceeding brought under these
statutes.4 4 The decision was based on the ground that the principal action and the supplementary proceeding are in legal contemplation separate
causes of action. If this concept prevails, it will follow that a judgment
or order may be had in a supplementary proceeding brought before the
expiration of the period limited for bringing an action on the original judgment even if the proceeding has not been completed when that period
terminates. Section 95.11 of Florida Statutes 1941 merely establishes
the time within which an action on a judgment must be commenced. It has
been held in North Dakota, however, that a supplementary proceeding
brought under statutes similar to those of Florida is merely incidental to
the main action and that no judgment or order can be obtained in it unless it is both begun and completed before the right to bring an action on
the original judgment is barred. 4 5
Even under the first of these opposing views, it would seem that a
"Chader v. Wilkins, 226 Iowa 417, 284 N. W. 183 (1939).
"Orange Belt Pack. Co. v. International Agr. Corp., 112 Fla. 99, 150 So. 264 (1933).
'"Merchants Nat. Bank v. Braithwaite, 7 N. D. 358, 75 N. W. 244 (1898).
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judgment or order obtained in the supplementary proceeding instituted
before and completed after the expiration of the limitation period applicable to the original judgment, would not extend the duration of the lien
of the original judgment as an independent lien. Similarly, the duration
of that lien as an independent lien would not be extended by the period of
pendency of a supplementary proceeding that was both brought and completed before the right to bring an action on the original judgment was
barred.
V. STATUTORY CHANGES THAT WOULD REDUCE THE NUmBER or
JUDGMENT LIENS EXTENDING BEYOND A SPECIVIED PERIOD

The duration of the lien of a judgment in Florida is, as already has
been stated, fixed by analogy to the statute of limitations. The enactment of a statute providing that the running of the limitation period against
the right to bring an action on a judgment should no longer be tolled by
events of the sort that theretofore had had that effect, would consequently
prevent the extension of the lien of the judgment by the occurrence of such
events subsequent to the effective date of the statute.
Even if the statute purported to have a retroactive effect, however, it
could not abrogate extensions of the duration of a judgment lien that had
been effectuated prior to its enactment. As was stated in the discussion
of the Florida statutes fixing the limitation -period applicable to mortgages and other instruments encumbering land, 4 6 Section 33 of Article III
of the Constitution of Florida forbids the enactment of any statute that
reduces the time within which a civil action may be commenced on any
cause of action existing at the time of its passage. Consequently, if the
time for bringing an action on a judgment had been extended before the
enactment of the statute by some occurrence -for example, the absence
of the judgment debtor from the state- the statute could not affect the
status existing at the time of is passage.4 7 This result would follow not
only if the statute was as to its retrospective effect enacted as a mere
curative act but also if it contained a limitation provision purporting to
require a judgment creditor to bring his action thereafter within a stated
period that would terminate before his right to bring it would otherwise
have been barred.
If, however, Section 33 of Article III of the present Constitution is
eventually replaced by the corresponding provision in the proposed new
"FLA.

STAT. §§95.28-95.34

(Cum. Supp. 1947).

"'See note 11 supra.
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Constitution prepared under the direction of the Constitution Committee
of the Florida State Bar Association, a statute reducing the time for bringing an action on a judgment could be applied retroactively to judgments
existing at the time of its passage, provided it gave the judgment creditor
a period of at least a year thereafter in which to commence his action. This
proposed provision 4 s reads:
"Limitations, reducing time. No statute shall be passed lessening the
time within which a civil action may be commenced on any cause of
action existing at the time of its passage without providing a period
of at least one year within which action may be commenced thereon."
As long, at least, as the present constitutional provision remains unchanged, the replacement of the present method of determining the duration of a judgment lien indirectly from the statute of limitations, by a
statute of limitations, by a statute expressly fixing that duration would
more effectively lessen the likelihood of a lien's being extended by extraneous circumstances than would a statute of the type just considered.
Such a statute would constitutionally abridge the duration of existing
judgment liens in instances in which the holder of the judgment had a reasonable time after the enactment in which he could enforce his lien; 49 but
it would be invalid as to an existing judgment lien on which the new
period had run before the passage of the act, unless the act contained a
saving clause giving the judgment creditor a reasonable time thereafter
for the enforcement of the lien. 50
A statute of this sort would, for example, prevent the absence of the
judgment debtor from the state from extending the duration of the judgment lien under the provisions of Section 95.07 of Florida Statutes
1941.51 It would not, unless it contained an express provision to that
effect, prevent extension of the continuance of the lien by a stay of execu"PROPOSED

CONSTITUTION

FOR

FLORIDA, Art II, §27.

The suggested change is

desirable. Section 33 of Article III of the present constitution renders many statutes
designed to remedy defective titles unconstitutional as to some situations with refer-

ence to which they otherwise would be upheld. It is believed that nothing similar
to the present provision is to be found in the constitution of any other jurisdiction.
'"Burwell v. Tullis, 12 Minn. 572 (1867); accord, Henry v. Henry, 31 S. C. 1, 9
S. E. 726 (1889).
"Accord, King v. Belcher, 30 S. C. 381, 9 S. E. 359 (1889) ; Merchants' Bank v.
Ballou, 98 Va. 112, 32 S. E. 481 (1899).

"Accord, Albee v. Curtis, 77 Iowa 644, 42 N. W. 508 (1889).
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tion; 52 an injunction restraining the enforcement of the judgment; 53 or
an appeal from the decision in which the judgment was rendered, accompanied by a supersedeas bond.5 4 A statute may be couched in such terms,
however, that even matters such as these will not extend the duration
of a judgment lien. 5 5 Such a statute would eliminate uncertainties in
titles to an extent sufficient to recommend it, particularly if the period of
existence of the judgment lien were maintained at the twenty-year term
that now normally prevails. In a statutory setting of this type, the probability of unavoidable attendant hardships for the judgment creditor would
be reduced to a minimum. Seemingly, however, a state statute could not
be so phrased as to prevent the extension of the duration of the lien of a
judgment by any time that the judgment debtor was in military servike
during the periods covered by the soldiers' and sailors' civil relief acts.5 6
VI. CONCLUSION

The title examiner cannot assume that a judgment against a present or
former owner of Florida land has ceased to be a lien on it merely because
twenty years has elapsed since the judgment was rendered. It is true that
nothing will have occurred to extend the lien of most judgments that are
more than twenty years old. The lien of the judgment that was sought to be
enforced in Massey v. Pineapple Orange Co., 5 7 for example, had not been
extended. It is true, also, that in the ordinary course of events no attempt
will be made to enforce a judgment that is twenty years old even if its lien
has been extended; but the attempt that was made in the Massey case to
enforce a judgment of that age shows that reliance cannot safely be placed
on the continued passivity of the holder of an old judgment. Even if no
effort is ever made to enforce an old judgment, its presence in the chain of
title will give rise to difficulties when the owner of the land attempts to
convey or mortgage it. Consequently a title examiner should not approve
a title unless he is certain that evidence will remain available to establish
that nothing has occurred to extend the lien of an unsatisfied judgment
beyond the time of his approval of the title.
"'Mercantile Trust Co. v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 69 Fed. 193 (W. D. Ark. 1895).
"3Wakefield v. Brown, 38 Minn. 361, 37 N. W. 788 (1888).
"'Barroilhet v. Hathaway, 31 Cal. 395 (1866).
"Byrne, Vance & Co. v. Garrett, 23 La. Ann. 587 (1871).
"054 STAT. 1181 (1940), 50 U. S.C. §523 (1946); 56 STAT. 770 (1942), So U. S. C.
§525 (1946).
'787 Fla. 374, 100 So. 170 (1924).
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